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ABSTRACT 
There is much interest in explaining the persistent ethnic gaps in education among Israeli Jews; 
specifically, the much lower attainments of those from Asian and African countries compared to 
the rest—Mizrahim vs. Ashkenazim, respectively. Some explanations (especially early ones) 
have stressed premigration immigrant characteristics, particularly the relatively lower level of 
educational attainment among Mizrahim. More recent interpretations have tended to focus on 
discrimination of various sorts that took place after the immigrants arrived in Israel. Crucial 
evidence for the discriminatory effect was introduced by Yaakov Nahon (1987), who 
demonstrated a shift toward a Mizrahi-Ashkenazi dichotomy in educational attainment 
between birth cohorts of adult immigrants and birth cohorts of adults born in Israel. From this 
evidence, a wide range of scholars concluded that the premigration educational characteristics 
of immigrants could not explain Israeli educational patterns, and that, consequently, the 
explanation based on discrimination was thereby greatly strengthened.  
  In this paper, we use the 1961 Israel census public-use dataset to refine Nahon’s 
analysis. Instead of using age cohorts as proxies for “fathers” and “children,” we focus on actual 
fathers and their children. Our results vary substantially from Nahon’s. In fact, we find that the 
educational attainment of immigrant fathers clusters quite closely around the Ashkenazi-
Mizrahi dichotomy, and conclude that it is no longer reasonable to rule out the premigration 
hypothesis. This outcome leaves researchers with a more challenging explanatory task than 
before, because they are now faced with the notoriously difficult situation of having to 
determine the relative influence of premigration characteristics, on the one hand, and of 
discriminatory processes, on the other.   
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There is much interest in understanding the sources of the educational gap between second-
generation Ashkenazim and Mizrahim. In particular, to what extent was the gap a result of 
disparities that were already observable among the immigrant parents from different countries of 
origin, and to what extent was it a reality created in Israel, resulting from the discriminatory 
impact of the local institutions charged with immigrant absorption? It has become the 
conventional wisdom to fault the Ashkenazi elite of the State in the 1950s and 1960s for 
neglecting the cultural, educational, and economic needs of immigrants from North Africa and 
the Asian countries, the immigrants that would soon be labeled Mizrahim (e.g., Khazzoom 2008; 
Shenhav 2006).  
There is plenty of evidence in the historical record that neglect (or worse) occurred 
(Segev 1986; Khazzoom 2008). However, the crucial question for social scientists is not whether 
discriminatory attitudes were prevalent but rather whether elite actions resulting from such 
attitudes were the crucial factor that created the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi gap found in second-
generation educational attainments. The competing theoretical hypothesis has always been that a 
similar Ashkenazi-Mizrahi gap already existed among the immigrant-parent arrivals. More 
explicitly, the competing hypothesis is that in the pre-State generation, Jewish educational 
attainments varied across countries in a way that already followed the later Ashkenazi-Mizrahi 
divide—that is, much higher in the former than in the latter. According to this competing 
hypothesis, differences in parental educational attainments were reproduced among their second-
generation children, for all the reasons that parents’ and children’s attainments are typically 
correlated—differential opportunities by parental social class (which is itself correlated with 
parental schooling), greater savvy about educational institutions among those who have more 
experience with them, and differences in outlook that may correlate with low and high 
educational attainments. A moment’s reflection will show that these competing hypotheses—
elite discrimination and parental premigration characteristics—are not mutually exclusive: both 
could have had an important influence on the second generation. Nevertheless, it is fair to say 
that in the early years of the state the hypothesis stressing parental premigration characteristics 
dominated social science discussion, while today the discrimination hypothesis dominates.   4 
 
One crucial reason that the hypothesis stressing parental remigration characteristics today 
commands less attention is the widespread belief that Yaakov Nahon’s Patterns of Educational 
Expansion and the Structure of Occupational Opportunit— the Ethnic Dimension (1987) 
elegantly demonstrated that the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide simply did not exist among the 
immigrant parents in the clear-cut way it appeared in the second generation. In particular, when 
Nahon studied immigrant men from five Mizrahi and four Ashkenazi groups, he found Mizrahi 
men in two of the groups averaged as much schooling as did Ashkenazi men from two others. No 
such overlap could be found among the second generation. Therefore, the much clearer ethnic 
dichotomy found in the second generation could not have been the product of premigration 
parental characteristics and must have been a creation of the social realities of the new State. In 
this paper we reconsider and refine Nahon's evidence; we conclude that it no longer demonstrates 
the sharp generational difference in the clarity of the ethnic dichotomy, and; indeed in our 
revision the ethnic dichotomy appears quite clearly in the data for both generations. 
Consequently premigration parental characteristics must form an important part of any 
explanation of the creation of the second-generation Ashkenazi-Mizrahi gap in attainment; such 
explanations cannot focus only or overwhelmingly on discrimination.  
 
NAHON’S EVIDENCE AND ITS RECEPTION 
 
Nahon focused on the largest immigrant groups that came to be called Ashkenazi or Mizrahi—
those from Romania, Poland, the USSR, and Germany-Austria on the one hand and Yemen, Iran, 
Morocco, Iraq, and Egypt on the other.
1 Optimally, he would have compared the educational 
attainments of immigrant parents from various countries of origin with the attainment of their 
Israeli-educated children. Since no dataset provided such information, Nahon did the next-best 
thing: he compared the attainments of immigrant men 60-64 years of age in the 1983 census 
from various countries of origin with the attainments of Israeli-educated men 30-34 years of age 
in the same enumeration; the former he designated the “generation of the fathers,” the latter “the 
                                                 
1 He treated Greece-Bulgaria as an anomalous group—like the Ashkenazi groups this was a European group but like 
the Mizrahi groups it was Sephardic in its Jewish communal traditions. But we need not concern ourselves with this 
last group. The focus of his argument and of our concern is the comparison among the other nine groups. In general, 
Nahon observes that in the Greece-Bulgaria group first and generation attainments both fall between the means for 
the Ashkenazi and Mizrahi categories. 5 
 
generation of the sons.”
2 We have reproduced Nahon’s results for immigrants and the second 
generation in Table 1, in columns a and b. Among the “generation of the fathers” country-of-
origin differences did not cluster into dichotomy as they would come to do later. True, the lowest 
attainments were found in Mizrahi groups and the highest in Ashkenazi groups; but there was 
also considerable diversity among immigrant men from the various countries of origin within 
each of the two broad categories, Mizrahi and Ashkenazi. And most striking, men from some 
numerically important Mizrahi groups nearly equaled or even exceeded the schooling attained by 
men from some of the numerically important Ashkenazi groups. In particular, Iraqi immigrant 
fathers lagged less than a year behind those from Romania; and the mean for Egyptian immigrant 
fathers actually exceeded the Romanian and equaled the Polish mean. And the Egyptians only 
comprised a small fraction of all Mizrahi immigrants Nahon studied, the Iraqis comprised nearly 
a third. And although these immigrant groups did not conform to an ethnic dichotomy, their 
offspring did. Column b of Table 1 shows that every second-generation Mizrahi group averaged 
at least 2.1 years less schooling than the mean in the lowest Ashkenazi group. Moreover, Nahon 
noted that differences within each dichotomous category had largely declined in the second 
generation and the remaining within-category differences did not much reflect the rank ordering 
of the immigrant groups. In sum, where there had been a multiplicity of country-of-origin groups 
in the first generation, an ethnic dichotomy was found in the second generation.  
    
                                                 
2 He also compared cohorts of older and younger women, but we restrict attention to the much more dramatic 





Table 1.  Two generations of educational attainments presented by Nahon:
immigrants and the second generation for selected countries of origin
GROUPS:                        MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING
by ethnic dichotomy
 and country of origin          IMMIGRANTS SECOND GENERATION
"generation of the fathers": "generation of the sons"*:
      age 60-64 in 1983       age 30-34 in 1983









Poland  10.0 13.9
USSR 10.6 14.0
Germany-Austria 11.4 14.0
SOURCE: Nahon (1987), Table 4.
* Includes those born in Israel or arriving before age 10; Nahon included the latter
   on the grounds that most of their education would have occurred in Israel.  
We will refer to this contention as the generational transition argument—a transition in 
educational attainments had occurred from a first-generation multiplicity based on countries of 
origin to second-generation dichotomy based on the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide.  This argument 
led to an obvious question: if the ethnic dichotomy did not exist in the immigrant generation, 
why was it dominant in the second generation? The implication was that something other than 
parental characteristics present at immigration had created the change, something in the 
dynamics of Israeli life. And this line of thinking in turn tended to strengthen the case for the role 
of discrimination in creating the ethnic dichotomy in second-generation outcomes, especially 
discrimination by the older Ashkenazi Israeli elites. We will refer to this idea as the generational 
transition corollary.  
 7 
 
Scholars as different as Calvin Goldscheider and Aziza Khazzoom have drawn out the 
implications. Thus Goldscheider comments,  
 
Analytically, these findings are consistent with the argument that ethnic 
differences among the second and later generations are not simply a carryover 
from places of origin but are the result of an Israeli-generated stratification 
system, reinforced by a complex combination of people and institutions-schools, 
teachers, family, and neighbors… The evidence available is clearly not consistent 
with the view that educational and other distinctions among ethnic groups are 
primarily the result of cultural distinctiveness and proximity to the cultures of 
places of origin (Goldscheider 1996, 136). 
 
  And Khazzoom notes, 
 The implication of Nahon’s work is that Israel did not receive Mizrahim and 
Ashkenazim, but rather created them out of a diverse set of country groups. Since 
an obvious hypothesis is that gatekeepers imposed the new group boundaries, a 
logical question is which ethnic categories were in use at the time and by whom. 
(Khazzoom 2008, 48). 
 
Nahon himself argued for the generational transition argument and he clearly meant to 
encourage a version of the generational transition corollary, stressing the relevance of various 
kinds of discrimination, by gatekeepers of one sort or another. Nevertheless, in the light of the 
emphasis on discrimination just noted, it is worth recalling that Nahon’s purpose was first and 
foremost to stress the generational transition argument and the implication that the dichotomy 
was a product of later dynamics in Israel. However, when it came to explaining exactly what 
social processes in the new State had led to the dichotomy, he stressed that further study would 
be needed and that his own very brief formulation was tentative. Nor did that brief formulation 
rest exclusively upon discrimination. Indeed, it draws explicitly on pre-migration social and 
cultural attributes as well.  
  The question [i.e.: how the pattern described by the generational transition 
argument came about] deserves a study of its own, more detailed than can be 8 
 
carried out with census data. Nevertheless, it may be possible to suggest a 
tentative (and partial) explanation. Possibly the explanation is linked to the social 
structural position into which most of the immigrants from Asia-Africa, including 
some of those who in terms of education (only one dimension of social standing 
[ha maamad havevrati]) resembled a large part of the immigrants from Europe. 
The process of “proletarianization” which they experienced upon immigration (a 
process that is described in the collective description of them as an inferior if not 
a “primitive” collectivity, through their absence of connections and being 
channeled to areas with a poor economic infrastructure, etc.) and on their part 
large family size considerably reduced economic resources available per capita 
(or for “the standard individual”) which were already fewer. Moreover differential 
fertility patterns (many children being situated precisely among the Mizrahi 
families of low standing), “inflated” the generation of the young with members 
from lower social standing, and thus these became dominant among the members 
of their communities. The connection between the social standing of the family 
and the educational attainment of the children indeed is quite striking in all the 
countries in which the subject has been studied, including in particular Israel 
(Nahon 1987, 34; italics added). 
  We will return at the end to Nahon’s careful formulations in this paragraph; however our 
major concern is with his celebrated evidence that the educational profiles of the immigrants did 
not cluster into the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy, and that the second generation pattern must 
have been a product of Israeli social dynamics. It was this evidence, and not the list of causal 
factors in the paragraph just quoted that received the attention. In any case, Nahon actually 
devoted only a few pages to the generational transition argument and corollary; they are 
presented in one table (Nahon 1987, Chapter 1, Table 4), a supporting statistical analysis of the 
same data, and some two pages of related text.  
His demonstration rests, as already mentioned, on the comparison of two five-year male 
birth cohorts: “the generation of the fathers”—immigrants 60-64 in 1983 and “the generation of 
the sons,” born 1949-53 (these latter born in Israel or brought there by age 9). In his brief 
discussion, Nahon always refers to the two cohorts as the “fathers” and “sons” (albeit in 
quotation marks). However, he was careful to warn that he is not comparing actual fathers and 9 
 
sons. “It should be noted that the concept of ‘fathers’ and of ‘sons’ has a generational 
significance only; some of these ‘fathers’ probably had no children of age 30-34 and some of 
these sons did not have a father of age 60-64” (29).  
It is precisely the question of how well his first generation cohort captures a “generational 
significance” that we will explore. We seek to identify more precisely the group of first-
generation immigrant men who fathered the second-generation cohort that Nahon defined. Thus 
we accept Nahon’s definition of the second-generation cohort (born 1949-53, and either born in 
Israel or arriving there by age nine) and we seek to identify the actual fathers of that birth cohort. 
We cannot identify the actual fathers in the 1983 census data: by then the sons have left their 
fathers’ homes. But we can identify actual fathers in the 1961 census data because individuals 
30-34 in 1983 (Nahon’s second-generation age cohort) had been 8-12 years of age in 1961. And 
at that age they were still very likely to be found with their fathers in the census.
 3 Of course we 
will not find the completed education of the sons in 1961 but that is not what we are after (we 
know enough about the completed education of the second generation from the 1983 data). We 
use the 1961 census data to identify the immigrant fathers of the second-generation birth cohort 
Nahon defined whereas Nahon himself had used a cohort of immigrant men of a certain age 
found in the 1983 census to represent the fathers of the second generation.




In the 1961 Israel census public use dataset (20% of the full enumeration) we isolated the male 
household heads who were immigrants from the nine countries of origin Nahon had studied; if 
these household heads also had an Israeli-born child in the 8-12 age range (or a child who arrived 
by age 9) they were selected as part of the group of actual fathers of Nahon’s second generation 
group. Several other steps in our procedure merit mention. 1) We limit our analysis to immigrant 
                                                 
3 Recall that both the 1961 and 1983 Israeli census public use samples cover 20% of the population, not 100%. Thus 
more precisely stated, we will identify in the 1961 dataset a 20% sample of actual fathers of children born 1949-53, 
just as Nahon defined the second generation cohort as a 20% sample of that birth cohort comprising individuals born 
in Israel or brought there by age 9. We cannot link actual family members across the censuses. 
4 It may be objected that our strategy will no longer involve a comparison of two age cohorts. True. But the reason 
for comparing the two age cohorts was to observe “the generation of the fathers” and “the generation of the sons.” 
The assumption was not that age cohorts reproduce educational patterns but rather that families do. To the extent 
that the older cohort resembles closely enough the cohort of the fathers, then comparing the two cohorts can 
substitute for comparing the group of actual fathers to their sons. The point of our exploration will be to show that in 
fact the older cohort is a poor substitute for the actual fathers.  10 
 
men who (a) were household heads in 1961, because we need to determine whether they had 
children in the relevant age range, and we can only do that through the census question “relation 
to head of household.” Similarly (b) we can only identify those fathers whose second-generation 
children 8-12 years of age were living in the same household with them.
5 2) Since we are 
interested in the characteristics of the fathers, we chose to include the fathers of both boys and 
girls 8-12 years of age. However, it is hardly probable that the fathers of boys and girls 8-12 







We will show that Nahon’s definition of the “generation of the fathers” as men in a certain birth 
cohort creates a misleading impression of the educational attainments among the actual fathers of 
his second-generation cohort. By a misleading impression we mean that the educational 
attainments of the actual fathers differ systematically from those in the cohort. Moreover, the 
educational attainments of the actual fathers compared to those of the birth cohort follow the 
Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy fairly closely. Thus the revision undercuts the generational 
transition argument and corollary. Table 2 provides a summary of the revision in column c. 
                                                 
5 The limitation of immigrant men to household heads of the relevant ages is inconsequential for our exploration 
(this will be clear to the reader from a comparison of the Appendix, columns b and c). Children not living with their 
father might have been living only with a mother or living in an institution (indeed the relevant father may have 
died). 
6 There are also two other  very small conceptual differences between our younger cohort and Nahon’s. 1) A few of 
those 8 and perhaps 9 years of age whom Nahon would later select from the 1983 data might not yet have arrived in 
Israel at the time of the 1961 enumeration (if they were brought to Israel at age 9). 2) A few of those in our cohort 
would have died by the time of the 1983 enumeration. Moreover, there is one other difference in the construction of 
the sample of children which is technical rather than conceptual. The 1961 dataset includes somewhat more 
corrupted records than do the later Israeli censuses—in particular households without a head listed, households with 
multiple heads. As a result we were obliged to exclude tiny proportions of the children.  11 
 
 
Table 2.  A Comparison of Educational attainments among:  
Nahon's "generation of the fathers"  and "generation of the sons"
and the actual fathers (of his 2nd-generation cohort observed in 1961)
GROUPS:  MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING:  SELECTED SUBGROUPS OF  IMMIGRANT MEN
by ethnic dichotomy  
 and country of origin Nahon's (1987) alternative measure*                            reanalysis: 
"the generation of the fathers":
                   1961 household heads only
all men, age 35-44 in 1961  all male heads fathers  of 2nd gen. 
children (ages 8-12)
age 35-44 in 1961           any age
                a  b      c
Mizrahi groups
Yemen 4.1 4.1 4.2
Morocco 4.8 4.8 4.7
Iran 5.5 5.5 4.6
Iraq 7.6 7.6 5.7
Egypt 9.3 9.3 8.6
Ashkenazi groups
Romania 8.5 8.5 8.1
Poland  9.1 9.1 9.1
USSR 10 10.2 10.2
Germany-Austria 11 10.8 11.0
SOURCES.   Column a from Nahon (1987) appendix table 12c.   Columns b and c from Public Use Microdata Sample for 
the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel Social Science Data Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).
* Nahon described the alternative measure (based on men 35-44 in 1961 rather than on those 30-34 in 1983) in his text 
(36), and presented the relevant table (12c) in his appendix.   Note that unlike his text table, which included both 
frequency distributions and means, the appendix table included only frequency distributions.   However, from the near-
identity of the educational distributions of all men and those who were reported as heads of household (see Appendix 
columns b and c), it is clear that the means for the two columns must have been nearly identical as well.   The means in 
Appendix column c are used for column b in this table.12 
 
Nahon actually offered two definitions for “the generation of the fathers,” one from the census of 
1983 and the other from the census of 1961; and he believed (correctly) that they were 
substantively equivalent for his purposes. His better-known definition is the one shown in  
Table 1, column a, based on immigrant men 60-64 in the 1983 census. This is the definition 
which he discussed in his text. However, in his appendix Nahon also presented data on 
immigrant men found in the 1961 census, when they were 35-44 years of age. We reproduce this 
second set of figures in Table 2, column a. Nahon commented that using his second definition for 
the “generation of the fathers” “does not change the picture described [in the text] at all” (36). By 
this he meant that a transition from first-generation country-of-origin multiplicity to second-
generation ethnic dichotomy is demonstrated using either column a or b for the immigrant 
generation.
7 Since we will be relying on the 1961 census, we concentrate on Nahon’s figures 
from that year. Also, there are virtually no differences between the attainments of all men in the 
birth cohort and those of men in the birth cohort who were household heads (columns a and b).  
However, when we shift attention from all male heads in the birth cohort to the male 
heads—of any age—who actually had children in the 8-12 age range (Table 1, column c), we 
find striking downward revisions in the means for three Mizrahi groups, the Iranians, Egyptians 
and most especially the Iraqis—for whom the mean falls from 7.6 to 5.7 years of schooling 
(column d, shaded columns). The revisions for the Ashkenazi countries are of much less 
consequence, the most important being the downward revision of the mean for Romanian 
fathers, from 8.5 to 8.1 years of schooling.  
There are two reasons why the educational attainment of the birth cohort of immigrant 
men (35-44 years of age in 1961) shown in columns a and b differed so markedly from that of 
the actual fathers of Nahon’s second generation shown in column c. One reason has to do with 
the nature of the relationship between a father’s educational attainment and the number of his 
                                                 
7 We too have no interest in the cross-census differences for the reports of these men. We would only note in passing 
that the reasons for the differences (which are in some cases quite large) could be many. Some men may have 
received modest amounts of additional schooling between 1961 and 1983, or they may have tended to inflate their 
reported schooling over the years. Also, modest differential mortality might have reduced the prevalence of the less-
well educated in the birth course over the two decades between 1961 and 1983. Finally in some groups (such as the 
Romanian) later immigration may have affected the results (Nahon did not limit his definition of first generation 
men by their year of immigration to Israel). The 1961 and 1983 definitions also differed in using ten and five-year 
age cohorts respectively; but this is not the source of the differences in reported attainments (see Appendix, columns 
c and d). 13 
 
children; the second has to do with the wide range of ages among actual fathers. We consider 
each in turn. 
 
Father’s Educational Attainment and the Number of His Children  
Suppose we begin with a birth cohort of male household heads and determine the mean 
educational attainment in the group. Next we select from within that same birth cohort only those 
who have children of a certain age (8-12), and we determine the mean educational attainment in 
this subgroup. Now, suppose too that in the birth cohort of men, those with less education have 
more children than those with more education. Then the more-educated will be less prevalent 
among the subgroup who are fathers than in the entire birth cohort, and the former’s mean 
educational attainment will be higher than the latter’s. If we use the former group to estimate the 
attainment of the latter the result will be biased upwards. For this bias to be large enough to 
matter substantively in our case, two conditions must be met by a particular immigrant group. 
First, the (negative) association between a man’s education and the number of his children must 
be fairly strong; and second, there must be fairly large proportions of men with both low and 
high levels of schooling. In fact, these two conditions are found in only one of our nine 
immigrant groups: the Iraqis.  
Table 3 deals with the association between fathers’ educational attainment and number of 
children. Column a shows that the men are divided into four categories of length of schooling. 
Columns b and c present the number and proportion of men who attained each level of 
schooling. Column d shows the mean number of children in the 0 – 18 age range that the men at 
each level of education averaged. Readers who have considered the social factors that influence 
the number of children per family will be familiar with this measure that relies on the entire 
dependent age range for the young; we present it for that reason. However, in the present context 
the critical need is to isolate a narrower group, the fathers of the second generation that Nahon 
defined. That second generation does not include children in the entire 0-18 age range, but only 
the children who were 8-12 years of age in 1961 (30-34 in 1983). It is critical therefore to isolate 
the fathers of this narrower age range of children; we will be studying only those fathers. Of 
course far fewer children were found in the narrower compared to the full 0-18 age range, and 
indeed many fathers of the latter had no children in the former. Still, the two measures were 
highly correlated—because the higher the number of children 0-18 that a father had, the more 14 
 
likely it was that at least one of them would fall in the 8-12 range. Column e shows the 
proportion of immigrant men 35-44 years of age who were in fact fathers of a child in the narrow 
8-12 age range; only this proportion of all the men at each educational level (shown in column b) 
will be included when calculating the mean educational attainment for the crucial subgroup of 
fathers.  
Finally the last two columns, f and g respectively show the mean educational attainments, 
first when all men in the cohort are included and then when only the subgroup of fathers with 
children 8-12 are included. The former mean (in column f) is arrived at by 1) determining the 
mean number of years of schooling attained by the men in each category of schooling shown in 
column a; 2) weighting this mean by the number of men at that educational level shown in 
column b; 3) summing these products and 4) dividing by the same product as in step 2 computed 
for all men in the immigrant group (total row). The computation of the latter mean (in column f) 
differs in one critical respect: in steps 2 and 4 the weighting is by the product of the number of 
men in column b and the proportion shown in column e who had a child in the 8-12 age range.  
Table 3 shows large differences in the numbers of children between Ashkenazi and 
Mizrahi (see the total rows for each group); and much of this difference can even be found at any 
given level of education (although less so among the most-educated Iraqis and Egyptians). 
However, our concern is not with this familiar Ashkenazi-Mizrahi difference in family size nor 
even with the ethnic differences in resources available for each child that the ethnic difference in 
family size created (Nahon, 1987; Leslau et al, 1995). Rather, our concern is whether the ethnic 
differences in family size can make Nahon’s birth cohort a biased substitute for the actual fathers 
of the next generation. 15 
 
Table 3.     Number of Children  to Male heads  of household, 35-44 years of age in 1961 : 
by head's country of origin and education
country of school male heads  male heads  male heads, 35-44: 
origin years by education by children with them mean years of schooling
completed* N % mean N % with a child all shown   with a child
0 - 18     8 - 12 in cols. a-b** 8 - 12
yrs. of age    yrs. of age yrs. of age
         a      b        c          d           e            f           g
MIZRAHI GROUPS
YEMEN 0 356 40 4.0 80
          1 - 8 402 45 4.0 81
        9 - 12 104 12 4.0 82
           13+ 25 3 3.8 72
          total 887 100 4.0 81 4.1 4.0
MOROCCO 0 464 34 4.6 78
          1 - 8 680 49 4.3 75
        9 - 12 200 14 4.1 76
           13+ 39 3 4.3 72
          total 1383 100 4.3 76 4.8 4.7
IRAN 0 101 22 4.3 80
          1 - 8 267 59 3.9 75
        9 - 12 82 18 3.3 72
           13+ 6 1                 na                   na
          total 456 100 3.9 75 5.5 5.5
IRAQ 0 246 17 4.4 78
          1 - 8 583 40 3.6 70
        9 - 12 439 30 2.4 48
           13+ 183 13 1.9 37
          total 1451 100 3.2 61 7.6 6.5
EGYPT 0 32 5 3.9 63
          1 - 8 248 40 3.2 65
        9 - 12 256 41 2.4 65
           13+ 81 13 2.2 56
          total 617 100 2.8 64 9.3 9.2
ASHKENAZI GROUPS
ROMANIA          1 - 8 1465 62 1.6 52
      9 - 12 618 26 1.6 48
     13 -15 145 6 1.6 48
          16+ 135 6 1.4 35
          total 2363 100 1.6 50 8.5 8.6
POLAND         1 - 8 2395 52 1.8 59
      9 - 12 1706 37 1.9 60
     13 -15 278 6 1.8 56
          16+ 208 5 1.8 53
          total 4587 100 1.8 59 9.1 9.1
USSR         1 - 8 556 36 2.0 63
      9 - 12 687 44 1.9 59
     13 -15 171 11 1.8 52
          16+ 148 9 1.7 49
          total 1562 100 1.9 59 10.2 10.3
GER-AUS         1 - 8 278 23 2.0 58
      9 - 12 720 59 2.0 61
     13 -15 136 11 1.8 54
          16+ 90 7 1.8 49
          total 1224 100 1.9 59 10.8 10.7
SOURCE:  Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel Social Science Data 
Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).
* Note that years of schooling for Mizrahi groups isolate 0 as a separate category from 1-8 and for Ashkenazi
      groups isolate 16+ as a separate category from 13-15.   This classification scheme is responsive to the
      distributions while still limiting attention to four levels.   
** These means also shown in Table 1, column c.16 
 
 
We can detect some negative association between the level of father’s education and the 
number of his children in most of the immigrant groups Nahon studied (Table 3, column d). 
However, male household heads in all the Ashkenazi groups averaged relatively few children 
(1.5-2.0), and the mean varied but little with educational attainment. Yemenite and Moroccan 
men, at the other end of the spectrum, averaged relatively many children (3.8-4.6) and there are 
only weak hints in the data that the mean might have begun declining among the best-educated. 
Only among the Iranians, Iraqis, and Egyptians was the negative association between head’s 
educational attainment and number of children strong, and especially so among the Iraqis. The 
average number of children by educational level falls consistently across a range of 2.5 children. 
Among the Iranians and Egyptians the ranges are respectively only 1.0 and 1.7 children.  
Moreover, the Iraqis also meet the second condition mentioned earlier: a fairly large proportion 
of the men are found at low and high educational levels (column c). There are far fewer Iranians 
than Iraqis at the top levels. And there are fewer Egyptian than Iraqis at the lowest level, men 
who reported no schooling. The upshot is that the Iraqi mean declines by 1.1 years of schooling 
when we limit attention within Nahon’s age cohort to the subgroup of men who actually had 
children in the 8-12 year age range (the sum of column b*column e at each educational level 
divided by the same for the group total). The means for the other groups hardly budge. 
 
The Wide Range of Ages Among Actual Fathers 
Nahon used five-year and ten-year birth cohorts to represent “the generation of the fathers” 
(immigrant men, 60-64 in 1983 and 35-44 in 1961). Table 4 shows that even if he had used the 
actual fathers rather than all men, limiting attention even to the larger ten-year cohort excludes 
more than half the fathers of his second generation in eight of the nine groups. If the educational 
attainments of the older or younger fathers differed systematically from those in the 35-44 age 
group, then the use of that age group to represent all fathers would be seriously biased. In fact, 
the impact of the age restriction varied dramatically across groups. Once again, for this distortion 
to matter substantively, two conditions had to be met in a particular immigrant group. First, 
excluded fathers had to have averaged considerably more or less schooling than the fathers 35-44 
years of age; and second, the proportion of excluded fathers in the age group that met the first 
condition had to be reasonably large (i.e.: the proportion of all fathers who were older or younger 17 
 
than the included cohort). In Table 4 the age subgroups that meet these conditions have been 
shaded (we use a mean difference .75 of a year of schooling as the criterion for the first condition 
and 10% of the fathers as the criterion for the second). 
 
Table 4.  Fathers of 2nd generation birth cohort: age distribution and educational attainment (1961)  
GROUPS:                               FATHERS OF THE 2ND GENERATION BIRTH COHORT (children 8 - 12 in 1961): By age of father 
by ethnic dichotomy
 and country of origin
              age 35-44              age LT 35            age GT 44                all ages  N
percent of mean years percent of mean years percent of mean years percent of mean years
all fathers of schooling* all fathers of schooling all fathers of schooling all fathers of schooling**
         a          b          c           d          e          f          g         h         i
Mizrahi groups
Yemen 40 4.0 20 4.3 39 4.2 100 4.2 1784
Morocco 45 4.7 23 5.3 32 4.1 100 4.7 2326
Iran 38 5.5 19 4.6 42 3.9 100 4.6 895
Iraq 34 6.5 19 4.9 46 5.4 100 5.7 2566
Egypt 54 9.2 11 9.1 35 7.8 100 8.6 728
Ashkenazi groups
Romania 49 8.6 12 7.5 38 8.2 100 8.1 2383
Poland  44 9.1 4 8.5 52 9.2 100 9.1 6126
USSR 38 10.3 4 9 57 10.5 100 10.2 2389
Germany-Austria 57 10.7 6 10.8 37 11.6 100 11.0 1264
SOURCE:  Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel Social Science Data 
Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).
* Also shown in Table 3, column f.
** Also shown in Table 2, column c.
Shaded columns highlight age groups Nahon excluded from the cohorts he studied that meet two conditions:
 a) mean years of schooling differed by .75 of a year or more from the mean years shown in column b for ages 35-44;
 b) the age group included at least 10% of all fathers.     
 
One such age subgroup was from Iran, and two each from Iraq and Egypt—and in all five 
cases, the excluded age groups had lower mean educational attainments than did the age group 
Nahon had selected. Consider the Iraqi case; the mean attainment of fathers 35-44 was 6.5 years 
of schooling, while the mean without regard to age was 5.7 years. Educational attainment had 
been rising for Iraqi Jewish men during some of the earlier decades; consequently men older 
than the 35-44 cohort tended to have fewer years of education than the selected cohort. At the 
same time the younger Iraqi male cohorts also fared less well than the 35-44 age group, probably 
because of dislocations related to a) World War II, b) the rising tensions for Iraqi Jews in the 
years just before the emigration, and c) the emigration itself. Some of the same factors no doubt 
caused the age differences in attainments in other immigrant groups. Indeed, they operated on 
Ashkenazi groups as well. Thus the younger cohorts in three of the four Ashkenazi groups had 
less schooling than did the 35-44 group. However, there were almost no relevant fathers in two 18 
 
of these three groups, and only 12% in the third. Overall, excluding the age groups younger and 
older than 35-44 leads to upward biases of at least half a year of schooling in Nahon’s table for 
four groups. In the revised figures (Table 4, column h), the mean for all fathers has been changed 
by -0.9 for Iran, -0.8 for Iraq, -0.6 for Egypt and -0.5 for Romania.  
When the effect of the age bias is added to the effect of the bias due to the negative 
association between a father’s education and the number of his children (in the Iraqi case only) 
we have the complete revision (Table 4, column h; also shown in table 2 column c). The revision 
in terms of a frequency distribution of attainments rather than a mean can be found in the 
Appendix (column d).
8  
We can now summarize the results for “the generation of the fathers.” Nahon took 
his figures for their educational attainments from a cohort of all immigrant men. We 
replace these with figures for the group of all immigrant fathers who actually had a child 
with them from Nahon’s second-generation cohort (8-12 years of age in 1961). The result 
is a downward correction in four groups, three of them Mizrahim. The revised figures are 
much more suggestive of an Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy than was the original 
evidence. The crucial difference between Nahon’s figures and our revision is that in the 
former Iraqis and the Egyptians did not conform to the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi first 
generation dichotomy; in the revised figures only the Egyptians do not do so, since Iraqi 
first generation attainments have been decreased by 1.9 years of schooling. The shift of 
the Iraqis is of great consequence: they comprised 31% of the first-generation Mizrahi 
fathers, the Egyptians only 9%.  
 
 Second Generation Outcomes 
In Table 5 we reproduce for convenience our revised first-generation means based on the 
relevant fathers in 1961 (column a) and Nahon’s second-generation outcomes for the 
cohort of men 30-34 in 1983 (column b). We now add columns c and d, presenting 
respectively the difference between first and second generation means (column b less 
                                                 
8 Note that at no time have we counted a particular father more than once. It could be argued that we therefore 
understate somewhat the extent of our revision. In a status attainment model we would focus on each second-
generation individual of the 1949-53 birth cohort and on each such individual’s father. In such an analysis, when 
several second-generation individuals had the same father, we would be counting that father as many times as he had 
children in that cohort. Using this approach, the means for three groups would change modestly, all falling below the 
level shown in Table 5 column a: Yemenite to 4.1, Iraqis to 5.5, and Egyptians to 8.3 years of schooling. 19 
 
column a), and the ratio of second to first generation means (column b/column a). Sons 
in all nine groups attained much more schooling than their fathers did. Moreover, the 
groups with the lowest levels of fathers’ attainment increased the most across the 
generations. For example, Yemenite fathers had averaged 4.2 years of schooling and their 
sons gained 6.8 years over that starting level; by contrast German-Austrian fathers 
averaged 11.0 years of schooling and their sons gained only 3.0 years. As a result, 
second-generation gaps both within and between the dichotomous categories generally 
narrowed across the generations (the Egyptians are the exception).
9 Scholars have 
differed in interpreting the decline between the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomous 
categories (Cohen and Haberfeld 1998; Friedlander et al. 2002; Rebhun 2009). But 
consider for the moment the decline in heterogeneity within each category of the 
Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy. In the Mizrahi category the range across four groups 
declined from 1.5 to 0.3 years of schooling, and if the Egyptians are included from 4.4 to 
0.6 years. In the Ashkenazi category, the range declined from 2.9 to 0.6 years of 
schooling. Nahon (1987) had also noted the decline in within-dichotomous-category 
heterogeneity, and had mentioned it as further evidence that the dichotomy only came 
into being in the second generation. So it is worth stressing that while we still find a 
decline in heterogeneity in the revised figures, these also differ somewhat from those he 
found. First, the decline in the Ashkenazi range is actually somewhat greater in the 
revised figures (in Nahon’s figures the decline can be seen in Table 2, column a and in 
Table 1 column b; for the Ashkenazim, it was from 2.3 to 0.6 years of schooling). By 
contrast, in the revised Mizrahi figures, the decline in the four-group range is much 
smaller (in Nahon’s figures the decline was from 3.5 to 0.3 years of schooling) and 
smaller too in the five-group range that includes the Egyptians (in Nahon’s figures the 
decline was from 5.2 to 0.6 years of schooling).  
                                                 
9 Other than the Egyptian case, the sole exception of any interest is that the Iraqi-Romanian gap increased slightly. 
Nevertheless, this increase is dwarfed by the gains in both groups across the generations. 20 
 
Table 5.   Immigrants and the second generation for selected countries of origin:
Educational attainment
GROUPS:                               MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOLING  RATIO OF MEANS:
by ethnic dichotomy SONS' TO FATHERS'
 and country of origin revised means "generation of the sons' inter-generational
for actual fathers (Israeli-schooled* difference in means
of children 8-12 in 1961men, 30-34 in 1983 (col. a less col. b) (col. b /col. a)
                   a                    b                   c
Mizrahi groups
Yemen 4.2 11.0 6.8 2.64
Morocco 4.7 10.7 6.0 2.30
Iran 4.6 10.8 6.2 2.36
Iraq 5.7 10.8 5.1 1.90
Egypt 8.6 11.3 2.7 1.31
Ashkenazi groups
Romania 8.1 13.4 5.3 1.65
Poland  9.1 13.9 4.8 1.53
USSR 10.2 14.0 3.8 1.37
Germany-Austria 11.0 14.0 3.0 1.27
SOURCES:  Column a from Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel 
Social Science Data Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).    Column b Nahon (1987) Table 4.  
 
Several processes other than discrimination can explain an important part of the 
second generation outcomes and the decline in within-category heterogeneity in 
particular. These processes are (1) a general rise in educational attainments across the two 
generations, (2) parental transfer of characteristics that encourage or discourage 
educational attainment, (3) institutional mechanisms unrelated to discrimination. 
First, a glance at columns c and d confirms that the average educational 
attainment in all the groups rose across the generations. Second, the parental transfer 
processes lead us to expect that the rank order of first and second generation attainments 
will be similar to each other, even as the average attainments in the younger generation 
increase in all ethnic groups. However, third, the magnitude of the gaps between groups 
is likely to change across the generations. One especially crucial institutional mechanism 
“pushes up the bottom groups”—the children of immigrant groups that came from 
environments in which extended schooling was not widespread. When such groups 
immigrate to a society in which universal schooling through the elementary grades is 
widespread and supported by compulsory school laws, such groups will typically 21 
 
experience dramatic increases in educational attainments between first and second 
generations. Examples are Italians and Poles in the American context (Lieberson 1980; 
Perlmann 1988, 2005) and Yemenites and Moroccans in the Israeli context (Table 5).  
The combination of these three factors produce much of the second generation 
outcomes in Table 5: higher means in all second compared to first-generation groups, 
continued (if reduced) differences between Mizrahim and Ashkenazim and smaller gaps 
within the dichotomous categories. Nevertheless, if only these three processes were 
operating we would still expect to observe some residual reflection of the parental-
generation rank orderings in the second generation—not merely across the Ashkenazi- 
Mizrahi categories but also within each category. Of course some within category 
heterogeneity remains—creating the range of 0.3 among four Mizrahi groups and 0.6 
among the Ashkenazi groups. However these ranges are small and they do not correlate 
terribly well with the first generation rank order (note especially patterns for Iraqis, Poles, 
and those from the USSR).  
The interpretation most consistent with the discrimination hypothesis would 
concentrate on Mizrahi and dismisses as irrelevant Ashkenazi homogenization; the latter 
could be due to ceiling effects. Specifically, the highest attainments for any groups in 
Israeli society at the time involved majorities completing secondary school and notable 
minorities completing post-secondary institutions. Such a pattern of attainments produced 
maximum second-generation country-of-origin means of about 14.0 years of schooling. 
Three Ashkenazim groups reach or nearly reach this mean, and the Romanians, the least 
educated in the first generation, failed to reach this putative mean by only 0.6 of a year of 
schooling. By contrast, the discrimination hypothesis posits that Mizrahi groups would 
have progressed farther but for discrimination. This is particularly true for the Iraqi and 
Egyptian groups whose fathers averaged higher attainments than the other three groups.  
The interpretation most consistent with the premigration parental characteristics 
hypothesis would stress the extent to which the gains in columns c and d in fact conform 
to the outcomes expected from the three processes mentioned (rise in grand mean, 
parental influence, raising the lowest to new-country levels), as well as the ceiling effects 
just mentioned. True, the Iraqi and Egyptian groups moved up less than expected in terms 
of the difference in means shown in column c; but note in connection with the key Iraqi 22 
 
case that the difference in means ignores how low the starting point for the Iraqi fathers 
was compared to Romanians (whose sons gained slightly more than Iraqi sons in the 
second generation). For this reason, the ratio of sons’ to fathers’ means is useful (column 
d): it takes into account the starting level of the parental generation. And indeed, in ratio 
terms only the Egyptians stand out as an important exception to the claim that we can 
explain results by reference only to the processes mentioned earlier in this paragraph.  
To repeat our major point, a formulation that ignored premigration immigrant 
characteristics as irrelevant to what needed explaining seems much less credible in the 




Two factors explain why Nahon’s definition of “the generation of the fathers” leads to 
misunderstandings relevant to the generational transition argument. First, in the case of the 
Iraqis, the negative association between a father’s education and the number of his children 
biased his figures upward. Second, in several groups, excluding fathers who were not in the 35-
44 age range biased his figures upward again. Our various refinements have not deviated from 
the concept of a group of men who constitute “the generation of the fathers”; we have simply 
defined that group as the actual fathers.  With the revised figures for first and second generation 
educational attainment, we find that only the smallest of Nahon’s Mizrahi immigrant groups, the 
Egyptians, averaged as much schooling as did an Ashkenazi group. In Nahon’s figures, the Iraqi 
immigrant averaged only 0.9 years less schooling than the Romanians; in the revised figures the 
gap is 2.4 years. Instead of 40% of Mizrahi immigrant fathers failing to conform to the 
dichotomy (Iraqis and Egyptians), 9% fail to do so. In the revision of Nahon’s table, the figures 
tend to confirm the presence of a first-generation ethnic dichotomy much more than his table did. 
In his original table, the supposed disconfirmation of a first-generation dichotomy had been seen 
as providing a strong basis for believing that the second generation dichotomy could be 
explained without resort to premigration immigrant social characteristics. By contrast, the greater 
confirmation of an immigrant-generation dichotomy in the revised figures now suggest that 
premigration immigrant social characteristics cannot be ignored in the explanatory effort. 23 
 
As we suggested at the outset, Nahon himself partially anticipated at least one of our two 
sources of revision, namely the larger number of children among less-education Mizrahim (he 
spoke of lower-social status Mizrahim; see the italicized section of the extended quote from his 
text, above). However, he may not have appreciated the extent to which this factor influenced the 
difference between his proxy for “the generation of the fathers” (i.e.: a birth cohort of immigrant 
men) and the actual immigrant fathers. And in general, if he did not have access to the 1961 
public use sample when he wrote (as seems likely), he could not pursue such issues in published 
tabulations from the enumeration. Indeed, he may not have had access to the public use sample 
for the 1983 census either. 
Nahon’s study stimulated research by Leslau et al. (1995) that, like our own study, 
concluded that premigration immigrant characteristics cannot be ignored in explaining the 
second-generation dichotomy. Leslau et al. focused on the Iraqis and Romanians; they did not 
revise Nahon’s own figures but stressed that figures for mothers’ education did tend to confirm a 
first-generation Ashkenazi-Mizrahi divide. And surely mothers as well as fathers helped 
determine second-generation educational outcomes. Leslau et al. also stressed that there was 
nothing comparable in the Ashkenazi groups to the substantial number of Mizrahi immigrant 
fathers who had reported no schooling (Nahon had included these in the group receiving 0-8 
years of schooling; see Table 3 for some relevant evidence).  
  We have concentrated in this paper on immigrant fathers’ attainments because that is 
where the key message from Nahon was to be found. We noted three conditions other than 
discrimination that operated to create the second-generation patterns: the rise in mean 
educational levels in all groups, parental influence upon children’s educational outcomes, and the 
especially high cross-generational increases in schooling for groups in which fathers immigrated 
with very low attainments (these groups now entered a society where the mean was much higher 
and the law compelled a certain minimum). Nevertheless, we also noted the homogeneous within 
category second-generation outcomes. We observed that the interpretation of these outcomes 
most consistent with the discrimination hypothesis would posit ceiling effects operating on the 
Ashkenazim and discrimination on the Mizrahim, or at least on the Iraqis and Egyptians. The 
interpretation most consistent with the premigration parental characteristics hypothesis would 
argue that sons improved relative to their fathers in the expected way, with the single exception 
of the Egyptians, the smallest Mizrahi group. Whatever explains the exception, this interpretation 24 
 
would hold, there is no need to assume that additional factor was particularly consequential for 
the other Mizrahi groups.
10  
In sum, our revision of Nahon’s table suggests that the educational attainments of 
immigrant fathers cluster fairly closely around the Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy—closely 
enough, at any rate, that we no longer find it reasonable to argue that the difference in the pattern 
across the two generations is so strong that the second-generation dichotomy did not have origins 
in first-generation premigration characteristics. Determining the balance between the influence 
of such premigration characteristics on the one hand and of discriminatory processes on the other 
will be hard to tease out, if it is even possible to do so. It would have been easier to explain 
second generation outcomes if we could indeed ignore as irrelevant one of these two competing 
hypotheses. But the revised evidence does not lead us to that simpler explanatory path.  
   A useful approach to the explanatory challenge, at least conceptually, may be to 
concentrate on Mizrahi fathers who had received extended schooling and on their sons. This 
focus also allows us to return to the exceptional case of the Egyptian immigrants. We found that 
their educational attainments still exceeded those of the Romanians and lagged only 0.5 years 
behind the Poles even after our revisions. At the same time we stressed that the Egyptians 
comprised but a small fraction of the Mizrahi immigrant fathers. However, were we able to get 
behind country-of-origin aggregates (immigrants from Egypt, Romania, etc.) our comparison of 
fathers and sons attainments could also focus on Mizrahi fathers of high educational attainment 
from other countries of origin. There were at least a few such fathers in every Mizrahi group; the 
distinction of the Egyptians is simply that the proportion of the more-educated was great enough 
among them to raise the group’s mean attainment to that of some Ashkenazi groups. We should 
consider the Iraqis in particular when thinking about Mizrahim other than Egyptians who had 
relatively high educational attainments.
11 Among the Egyptians, 49% of immigrant fathers had at 
least some secondary schooling (Appendix, column h); among Iraqis the comparable figure was 
                                                 
10 This line of argument would note too that since the Egyptians were the smallest group, their second-generation 
school patterns may have been influenced by those of the other Mizrahi second generation, ten times their number. It 
is reasonable to suppose that ties of language and religious rite led to a certain degree of cohesion among Mizrahim 
from different countries of origin, quite apart from the action of any discriminatory processes. 
11 Many Iraqis had received no schooling but about as many had at least reached secondary school. Premigration 
parental characteristics by place within country of origin probably played a substantial role in creating this split. The 
better-educated are likely to have come disproportionately from the Baghdad community; the less-well educated 
may have come disproportionately from the Kurdish region. See Darvish (1987). 
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only 27%. Nevertheless, because the relative sizes of these two immigration streams, the actual 
number of Iraqis who had reached secondary school was nearly twice as large as the number of 
Egyptians who had done so. If we were not constrained to study intergenerational patterns of 
educational attainment in terms of country-of-origin aggregates, we could illuminate much more. 
In particular, were the second-generation Mizrahi educational outcomes lower than the outcomes 
of sons born to Ashkenazi fathers of comparably-extended schooling? It certainly seems so from 
the aggregate figures for the Egyptians. If so, can the explanations for the Egyptian outcome be 
extended to the other second-generation Mizrahim, those whose immigrant fathers had not 
received extended schooling? This way of putting the question amounts to asking why a 
reasonably clear Ashkenazi-Mizrahi dichotomy of educational attainments observed in the first 
generation was not more fully erased in the second generation—rather than why an ethnic 
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Appendix .   Means and distributions of educational attainment for  selected groups of male immigrants
Mizrahi groups
YEMEN MOROCCO
Education Nahon's (1987) figures: revision:  Nahon's (1987) figures: revision: 
years of   immigrant males heads of household  immigrant males heads of household
schooling by age in two censuses  by age in two censuses 
60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of  60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of 
2nd gen* 2nd gen*
in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961 in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961
a b c d a b c d
mean 4.0      na 4.1 4.2 5.4      na 4.8 4.7
0-8 years 87 85 85 84 78 82 83 84
9-12 yrs 10 12 12 13 18 14 14 13
13-15 yrs 3 3 2 3 3 2 2 2
16+yrs 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
total 100 100 100 100
N 985 887 1784 1564 1383 2326
IRAN IRAQ
Education Nahon's (1987) figures: revision:  Nahon's (1987) figures: revision: 
years of   immigrant males heads of household  immigrant males heads of household
schooling by age in two censuses  by age in two censuses 
60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of  60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of 
2nd gen* 2nd gen*
in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961 in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961
a b c d a b c d
mean 6.5      na 5.5 4.6 8.5      na 7.6 5.7
0-8 years 77 81 81 87 50 56 57 73
9-12 yrs 19 17 18 12 34 31 30 21
13-15 yrs 3 1 1 0 12 9 9 4
16+yrs 2 0 0 1 5 4 4 2
total 100 100 100 100
N 515 456 895 1721 1451 2566
EGYPT
Education Nahon's (1987) figures: revision: 
years of   immigrant males heads of household
schooling by age in two censuses 
60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of 
2nd gen*
in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961
a b c d
mean 10.0      na 9.3 8.6
0-8 years 40 46 45 51
9-12 yrs 41 41 41 40
13-15 yrs 16 9 9 7
16+yrs 4 4 4 2
total 100 100
N 725 617 728
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Appendix  cont.   Means and distributions of educational attainment for  selected groups of male immigrants
Ashkenazi groups
ROMANIA POLAND
Education Nahon's (1987) figures: revision:  Nahon's (1987) figures: revision: 
years of   immigrant males heads of household  immigrant males heads of household
schooling by age in two censuses  by age in two censuses 
60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of  60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of 
2nd gen* 2nd gen*
in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961 in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961
a b c d a b c d
mean 9.4      na 8.5 8.1 10.0      na 9.1 9.1
0-8 years 48 62 62 64 43 52 52 53
9-12 yrs 34 26 26 26 40 37 37 36
13-15 yrs 8 6 6 6 9 6 6 7
16+yrs 10 6 6 4 8 5 5 5
total 100 100 100 100
N 2785 2363 2383 5200 4587 6126
USSR GERMANY-AUSTRIA ***
Education Nahon's (1987) figures: revision:  Nahon's (1987) figures: revision: 
years of   immigrant males heads of household  immigrant males heads of household
schooling by age in two censuses  by age in two censuses 
60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of  60 - 64    35 - 44   35-44 fathers of 
2nd gen* 2nd gen*
in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961 in 1983 in 1961 in 1961 any age, 1961
a b c d a b c d
mean 10.6      na 10.2 10.2 11.4      na 10.8 11.0
0-8 years 36 35 36 35 19 28 23 19
9-12 yrs 35 44 44 44 55 55 59 60
13-15 yrs 15 11 11 11 15 11.4 11 13
16+yrs 15 10 9 9 10 6 7 8
total 100 100 100 100
N 1792 1562 2389            na** 1224 1264
SOURCES:  Cols. a and b from Nahon (1987), Tables 4 and Appendix Table12c respectively.
Cols. c and d from Public Use Microdata Sample for the 1961 Census of Israel (from Israel 
Social Science Data Center, Hebrew University, Jerusalem).  
*Heads for which educational data were missing have been omitted.    These amount to fewer than .7 of 
1% for eight groups and to 1.65% for Yemen.   (N col. c)/(N col. b) was in the range .84-.90 for all groups.
** Using Nahon's definition for the second generation: Israeli born or arrived before age 10.
 *** In the case of Germany-Austria, there appears to be a misprint in Nahon's text for the N in col. b. 
  